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 Introduction 
A key issue in the global debate is inequality. There is nothing new about the existence of 
it as a persisting feature of capitalism. Despite the historic compromise achieved after the 
Second World War that led to higher integration of workers into the social and economic 
orders of capitalist societies in Western Europe, the system fell short of promoting equality 
of conditions, beyond the formal legal status of all citizens in liberal democratic polities. In 
the so-called periphery of the capitalist world, inequality remained as the unbending rule of 
protracted processes of uneven and combined development which prompted sociologies of 
underdevelopment, marginality, dependency, and so forth. The promise was that 
accelerating the pace of economic growth and technological innovation, the peripheral 
countries would all attain the bright future of modernization. Despite all the criticism – both 
theoretical and practical – met with along the 1970s by such ideological representations of 
capitalism as a historic form able to produce widespread prosperity and social integration, 
the rise and global expansion of neoliberal discourse and policies reinforced the 
conventional association between the adoption of market economies and better 
opportunities for all.  
As from the mid-1990s a growing number of voices began to be heard which pointed 
towards the increase in inequalities worldwide as a result of the implementation of 
neoliberal and Third-Way policies. Data on the spread or intensification of inequalities over 
the recent decades are simply breathtaking: it has increased rather than diminished (cf. 
Green, 2008, p. 2-6, 180-81, 186-90, 224; Ipea/IBGE, 2004, p. 14-21, 36-42; UNDP, 2005). It 
increases in several contexts even though extreme poverty has decreased since the 1990s. 
Which means that the old story holds true according to which more wealth and skin-deep 
social policies do not translate into less inequality. This of course contrasts with all the luring 
promises of a deeper interconnectedness among economies, societies and cultures for 
furthering well-being, freedom, choice and progress. Persisting inequality also flies in the 
face of the concrete possibility for the global economy to actually end poverty, thus 
highlighting the inevitable ethical and political intimations to seriously respond to the 
challenge.  
The period above coincides with a process of emergence of new candidates to the select 
team of global capitalist players, attributed at first to economic performance – societies with 
huge and under-explored internal markets, abundant and cheap labour, relatively 
sophisticated technological base, that were going through market reforms and taking 
advantage of the global scenario. Only slowly and unevenly some awareness developed as 
regards both the multi-dimensional character of globalization and the extent to which the 
new partners could not and would not reiterate the paradigm of modernization. Accordingly, 
assessments of perspectives opened up by global flows, despite attempts by hegemonic 
forces to round everything up under the  spell of economic interests and dynamics, led to 
the diversification of trajectories, allowed for non-economic actors to also become active in 
the global debate and turned more complex the relation between national and local 
contexts and global processes.  
Thus, there is more to emergence than mere economic performance. What has emerged 
in the past two decades of frantic experimentation with the discourse2 of globalization are 
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  I use the concept of discourse here in the sense attributed to it by Laclaunian post-structuralist theory, 
influenced by Wittgenstein's idea of language games, French discourse analysis's conception of discourse as a 
 social formations with particular histories and cultural identities. One feature of these, to 
keep to my opening fil conducteur, is the ingrained dimension of inequality that has 
historically characterized them. It has been deepened but not initiated with neoliberalism. 
And some signs already show that political and cultural changes are essential to the task of 
reducing inequality at a significant pace. How can one make sense of persisting inequalities 
over the long term process of integration to capitalism in these societies3, with short periods 
of reversal but hardly being able to recast the pattern in the long run? Is there a reverse 
process whereby the current outlook of emerging societies sheds light on the situation in 
advanced capitalist societies? Can there be any learning from the efforts taking place in such 
emerging societies to overcome the perverse connection of economic performance, 
technological advancement and persisting injustice? This chapter, and others in this book, 
asserts the need to frame the notion of emergence in terms which go beyond economic and 
geopolitical logics of explanation, the need to incorporate reflection on sociocultural tenets. 
It is not framed within a politico-institutional or an economic perspective, but insists that 
critical analysis cannot shy away from the political character of any process of social 
institution. This does not mean approaching the question of emergence in terms of “power 
politics” or international geopolitics. However, it does imply that the political operates 
within every social dimension and cannot be evacuated from analysis with impunity.  
There has been, to that effect, an ambiguous but extensive acknowledgement of the 
cultural dimension of these processes – not only in terms of cultural heritages and forms of 
experiencing and facing up to the challenge of inequality, but also in terms of increasingly 
resorting to culture as a remedy or strategic weapon against the effects of globalization cum 
growing inequality. This recourse to culture is ambiguous because it brings to the fore 
antagonistic demands for inclusion, justice and/or reparation from groups defined on the 
basis of cultural traits (ethnicity, gender, age, religion, language, sexuality, territorial 
autonomy), while culture also becomes an object of hegemonic struggle as an instrument of 
more effective market strategies, or the management of conflicts and social disintegration 
(cf. Yúdice, 2004). 
So, the question of inequality is at once material and symbolic, economic and politico-
cultural4. It calls for historical sensitivity (in other words, attention to particularities and 
trajectories, but also to contingency in how structural features have evolved into their 
present form) and for a global/local nexus. In the context of globalization, it is a question of 
how different modes of articulation have varied as a function of local circumstances. Through 
resistance, translation or failure, global capitalism has been altered as it is iterated5. And 
over the past decades, as a partial outcome of global trends, the trajectory of emerging 
                                                                                                                                                        
material force, and pragmatic linguistic definitions of discourse, Laclau stresses that discourse necessarily 
implies language and action, linguistic and non-linguistic dimensions (cf. Laclau and Mouffe, 1989; Laclau, 2005; 
Howarth and Glynos, 2007). 
3
  Latin American societies are part of the constitutive moments of the world capitalist system, as colonies of 
the Iberian powers, though their integration as independent nations dates from as early as the 1820s. The 
timing and modes of integration for contemporary emerging societies varies extensively, but one could say that 
the period from the 1930s can roughly be taken for a marker of the intensification of such a process. 
4
  This is view is put forward in passing by Amartya Sen, in his discussion of India’s global insertion. He both 
acknowledges the point that the key debate on globalization has to do with inequality and that how unequal 
the world is or has become is the object of heated dispute (cf. Sen, 2006, p. 341-342). 
5
  I allude here to Derrida's conception of iterability, which can help us deal with the question of repetition 
(or system expansion) without recourse to notions of reproduction or evolutionary understandings of change 
(cf. Derrida, 1982; 1990; Burity, 1994). 
 societies render all too explicit the contradictory and hardly predictable forms in which 
modernization, capitalism and globalization intermingle. Whether one speaks of China, India, 
Brazil, Mexico or South Africa, for instance, inequality is a prominent feature of their history, 
past and present, though with different characteristics. And perhaps, because globalization 
is not a one-way process, one can say that their story is fast becoming, retroactively, the 
story of the advanced societies of the North as they grapple with the combined effects of 
neoliberal or Third-Way politics, increased non-Western immigration and the rise of right-
wing or conservative-liberal ideologies. 
I wish to argue in this article that the manifold patterns of globalization in relation to 
inequality can give rise both to the emergence of economic powers (again) rooted on 
widespread or deep social inequalities and to transversal forces – that cut across social 
domains (such as the economy, politics or cultural life), national borders, and social groups or 
classes – seeking to reinforce or to overturn those inequalities. This requires a broader 
approach which encompasses various dimensions of social life that are crucial to 
understanding and acting upon inequality. Emerging countries such as those mentioned 
above experiment strong, sometimes lacerating, tensions between opening and closing 
themselves to external forces; modernising and resisting the exclusionary dimensions of 
modernity; relinquishing collective commitments to welfare and tackling mounting violence; 
joining the discourses on macroeconomics stability and responding to abject poverty; 
bringing to light cultural diversity, protecting it from dissolving into consumer culture and 
checking prejudice and intolerance. They also seem to portray the kinds of social 
arrangement globalization as it is currently evolving is likely to produce in most parts of the 
world: social and economic exclusion, ethnic clashes, racial prejudice, and violence, 
alongside startling affluence, consumerism and technological sophistication, whereas also 
allowing for cross-border articulation of social movements and progressive organizations, 
the dissemination of imagery of resistance and new repertoires of action which may assist 
local dissenting groups.  
Moreover, these societies’ cultural formation increasingly accounts for significant 
variations they have displayed in the course of their becoming global players (or is perceived 
to do so), but also for some of the lasting aspects of subordination and oppression that have 
marked modernization processes both in advanced capitalism and in the emerging semi-
periphery of the capitalist world. This calls for heightened attention to the processes 
whereby difference is asserted vis-à-vis the dominant side of globalization as well as to the 
movements which, across borders, and mobilizing various values, social identities and 
repertoires of action, voice the need for equality and justice to prevail within and among 
nations. 
In order to pursue this line, I take the Brazilian case not only to illustrate the process, but to 
raise a claim that goes in two directions: a) several of the current trends in the process of 
globalization are not entirely unheard-of in societies which have for a long time been part of 
the world created after the sixteenth-century colonial and the nineteenth-century 
imperialist expansions of Western European countries – former episodes of globalization6; b) 
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  This is not new as a general point, having been put forward by different analysts of globalization, like Tilly, 
Robertson or Sen, who insist on the existence of previous processes of globalization. What I add to their view is 
the point that the colonial and postcolonial conditions “allowed” the subaltern societies to experience and 
develop responses, from the very beginning of their encounters with the West, to several features of present-
day globalization, though this avant-la-lettre experience has taken place amidst the contradictory and unevenly 
 intermediary societies, located in the semi-periphery of the capitalist world, can be 
privileged points to make sense of several of the new developments introduced by the 
intensification of the global trends. Confronted with the Euro-American-centric paradigm of 
modernization and advanced capitalism (cf. Lander, 2005, p. 21-53; Quijano, 2005, p. 227-
78), emerging societies fall far behind the social levelling (welfare) enjoyed by the majority 
of citizens in those societies included in the paradigm. They seem to be too marked by 
particularism to qualify for the new position. 
However, as Santos argues, for those countries showing an intermediary level of 
development, “working out the calculus of hegemonic globalization is much more complex. 
To start with, there is at once some capacity to capitalize on the advantages and a 
reasonable vulnerability as regards the risks” (2002, p. 12). He mentions Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal, Greece, in Europe; Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, in South America, and adds, 
“*i+n the semi-peripheral countries, the conflicts and disjunctions provoked by the 
hegemonic globalization thus tend to be more intense and have more unpredictable effects” 
(Ibidem). 
1. Global/local dynamics and the place of culture 
According to Santos (2002), in our transitional global system conflicts and the unequal 
exchanges that express and result from them crisscross. Thus, questions affecting the 
relative position of nation states; questions relating to the appropriation or valuation of 
mercantile resources between the global capitalist class and the nationally-based classes; 
and questions regarding the recognition of the appropriation or valuation of non-mercantile 
resources such as ethnicity, identities, cultures, traditions, sense of belonging, imaginaries, 
rituals, or literature – give light to composite, hybrid or dual conflicts. Among these 
questions, the latter kind has shown prominently for some time now. Whether evolving as a 
result of the global/local frictional logic leading to numerous forms of resistance, or being 
expressed through the dissemination of struggles for the recognition of subaltern identities, 
culture has become a catchword for the forms of politics that can redraw the boundaries of 
the political in our time. Thus, it is crucial for the analysis of the processes of globalization 
that one focuses on the global/local dynamics in order to capture such a cultural dimension. 
It has traditionally been through the metaphor of “the local” that culture has been 
understood – whether academically, politically or in the eyes of tourists and businesspeople 
–, and when talking about globalization many voices seem to point to a tension between 
global and local, while other voices celebrate the sheer diversity that global travels and 
media images disclose and bring near. 
It can be easily shown that global and local are not irreconcilable poles. As several 
authors have already singled out, not only every successful globalization is rooted in a 
localism (Anglo-Saxon neoliberal discourse, for instance), but also globalization presupposes 
localization (that is, produces it elsewhere, through hierarchization or time-space 
compression) (Santos, 2002, p. 63-65; Burity, 2001, pp. 156-173). The global metaphor or 
                                                                                                                                                        
developed dimensions of economic, social, political and cultural life that have marked those nations as 
“underdeveloped”, “poor” or “non-modern”. For several reasons, some of which will be spelled out here, such 
distinctive marks of the postcolonial, subaltern societies have been seen to revolve around the trappings of 
cultural difference, whereas in the Western capitalist societies the process was for a long time credited to 
world-historical laws of development dictated by reason and progress. Recent changes to this process, pointing 
to a decentring of the West, leading to the emergence of new loci of power outside Europe and America, have 
been responded to as a threat or civilizational crisis. 
 global concrete events (e.g., the announcement of a new policy; the negotiation of financial 
support for projects or to tackle crises; or a global meeting promoted by the UN, the World 
Economic or the World Social Forums) work as tertiums between inside and outside, near 
and distant, one’s own and alien, etc.7, thus articulating the two poles. The tertium does not 
require the end of local references, but reinscribes them onto a terrain in which they can no 
longer be defined in isolation or by mere appeal to territorial or politico-cultural closure. 
Therefore, globalization both forms and distorts, requires and resists the singularity of the 
local (as community or nation, municipality or region). In turn, this tertium de-territorializes 
and de-institutionalizes the stability of the frontier between those reference points, though 
in manners fraught with paradoxes and ambiguities.  
However, if it is true that a clear implication of the operation of the tertium of 
globalization is that the local counts, we must supplement the de-territorialising emphasis, 
and perhaps the impression left by the argument so far, in order to give due consideration to 
(re)territorialising practices. A good case for it is made by Arturo Escobar (2005, pp. 133-68), 
whose demarche also leads back into the theme of culture that lies at the heart of the 
analysis proposed here (cf. Santos, 2002, pp. 72-75; 2003). Escobar (2005, pp. 134-35) 
argues that the weakening of place in the discourses on globalization has brought serious 
consequences to our understanding of culture, knowledge, nature and the economy and 
that it is time to balance that. 
Rather than essentializing the local as the decisive and unambiguous site of 
transformation, Escobar draws the attention to the concrete social contexts in which the 
effects of globalization are translated – but also reconstructed – into vernacular cultures, and 
which also demand to be heard in their own terms. He also highlights the need to counter 
the view that the only form of relation to reality in global times is through de-territorialized 
identities – privileging travel, mobility, nomadism, dislocation and diaspora and overlooking 
the rootedness of the majority of the people everywhere in the world (even those who 
migrate to other countries. For him, place is “a form of lived and rooted space”, “the 
location of a multiplicity of forms of cultural politics, that is, of the cultural becoming politics, 
as evidenced in the tropical forest social movements and other environmental movements” 
(Idem, p. 151-52).  
Now, it is not hard to see how this move toward place, as an instance of the local, brings 
us close to notions of culture and identity. For many social groups, communities, cities, 
regions or even nations in the world affected by the spread and grip of globalization or 
global-talk, the transformations they have to negotiate or live with have a direct bearing on 
their forms of life and the way they perceive themselves and others. Global values and 
practices have often meant uprooting the local as a reference, weakening social bonds, 
introducing demands for which most people find themselves structurally incompetent or 
unable to meet, and draining in a perverse way their chances of sustainable living conditions. 
On the other hand, global events or the effects of global flows in these contexts raise or 
prompt the awareness of cultural difference, thus imaginarily awakening, reinforcing, 
recreating or splitting particular identities, as well as giving rise to new ones. This is not just 
something which happens to local communities or social movements and organizations from 
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  This image of the “third” can be found in several contemporary authors, like Bhabha, Laclau, Soja, or 
Derrida, with different applications and implications. In all of them, there is a clear discomfort with and 
disengagement from dualistic and binary thinking. 
 the outside. It is in the frontier(s) drawn by the differentiation or antagonism prompted by 
the global/local “encounter” that a sense of belonging, of particularity and of project 
emerges8.  
There is, nonetheless, a second form in which culture – in between local and global – can 
also qualify what emerges in the global scenario as a force. It could be called the cultural 
rooting of capitalist development. Recognition of this goes back a long way and different 
theoretical perspectives have been brought to bear on this (cf. e.g., Amin, 1989; King, 1991; 
Wallerstein, 1993; Putnam et al., 1993; Appadurai, 1996; Robbins, 2004; Eisenstadt, 2002). 
As I see it, this is a route of dissemination (Derrida), running both toward disavowing the 
theory of reproduction (according to which capitalism spreads and repeats itself “at its core” 
wherever it goes) and toward asserting the modern character of capitalism in the so-called 
periphery. Cultural determination of the form and content of capitalism is not, therefore, a 
particularism of the periphery, but is a defining trait of the phenomenon as a whole. The 
view according to which emerging societies' distinctive capitalist development is both a 
function and expression of their cultural specificity proves ethnocentric: globalization helps 
highlight the cultural rooting of Western capitalist societies as they encounter competition 
and resistance from other (subaltern) capitalist societies.  
This form of expression of culture allows us to see in the historical process of capitalist 
development, and its hegemonic global configuration, both the element of dissemination 
and the element of cultural particularism – understood not as an idiosyncrasy but as the 
outcome of symbolic disputes for the definition of the real among social actors – whereby 
the former is “translated” and reshaped. In the global juncture, when there are signs of new 
powers emerging as “national” variants of global capitalism, this second form of cultural 
expression can be illuminating of trends that – following our point about the de-
territorialization and de-institutionalization of the frontier between global and local – are in 
operation in the global scenario, in different ways. It helps perceive as well the cultural 
dimension of exploitation, subordination and inequality that is often overlooked by analyses 
of globalization focused on economic dynamics. Culture, here, both illustrates how 
capitalism takes roots and how its intimations are invariably negotiated by local elites or 
consumer publics and adapted to local mores, whether reinforcing asymmetries or 
contributing to dislocate them. 
Let us now see, in the Brazilian case, how this double dimension of resistance and 
conformity as regards the links between global and local operates. 
3. Brazil: conservative, selective modernization and the naturalization of inequality 
Brazil, as one in the list of emerging societies/economies/political powers, is a telling 
example of the meanderings of modernization in a post-colonial situation. Let us take a quick 
look at this by means of a cultural approach that highlights the ways in which modernity was 
historically constituted there. This will be done in two moments: first, by assessing in this 
section the way in which the legacy of slavery – and the enormous difficulty for modern 
Brazil to integrate its Afro-descendant population into the social, economic and political 
mainstream – qualifies a double feature of the process: elitism and social exclusion; and 
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  A good example of such a complex take on the importance of locality (which must be understood both in 
spatial and symbolic terms) is the discussion offered by Silva (2006) on the adoption and implementation of 
affirmative action policies in Brazil and South Africa in favour of black (and poor) students in public higher 
education. 
 second, in the next section, by taking up the case of public policy in order to see how 
contests for the definition of inclusion have, as from the 1990s, involved both cultural 
demands and appeals to globalization. 
A startling trait of this emerging society is the clear contrast between its economic 
complexity, cultural diversity, and vexing social inequality. It is a clear case of the non-
necessary correspondence between economic growth and sophistication and a fair share of 
the common citizens in their country’s wealth. Brazil exhibits the kind of articulation that 
risks becoming the stable outcome of current forces driving globalization. It witnesses to 
how insane it is, as Jessé Souza argues,  
“to imagine that economic growth can do now what it has failed to accomplish over 
50 years. In all countries that homogenized their classes … – England, the United 
States, France – the driving force was not economic growth. In capitalist systems, 
growth generally produces more inequality. It has been religious, cultural, moral and 
political demands that extended the model of being bourgeois toward the lower 
classes” (Souza and Pinheiro, 2003).  
I am not endorsing Beck’s image of the “Brazilianization” of the world, as if the whole 
story were about the Brazilian failure to promote social integration and pacify everyday life. I 
am rather making a point about the articulation of economic modernization with social 
inequality as a ubiquitous mark of hegemonic globalization as portrayed in the trajectory of 
Brazilian capitalism (cf. Nunes, 2002, pp. 301-44)9. As argued by Jessé Souza, a leading 
Brazilian social theorist, the decisions resulting in the particular form taken by the capitalist 
order in Brazil, particularly as from the late-19th century, were not a surrender to a pre-
modern personalistic and patrimonialistic Iberian tradition, but already an outcome of deep 
processes of modernization: 
“the naturalization of social inequality in peripheral countries of recent 
modernization, such as Brazil, may be more adequately perceived as a consequence, 
not stemming from an alleged pre-modern and personalistic heritage, but precisely 
the opposite, that is, as resulting from an effective process of modernization of great 
proportions which increasingly takes over the country as from the early 19th century. 
In this sense, my argument implies that our inequality and its everyday naturalization 
is modern, for it binds the efficacy of modern values and institutions based on their 
successful import ‘from outside in’. Thus, rather than being personalistic, it [such 
inequality, JAB+ draws its effectiveness from the ‘impersonalism’ typical of modern 
values and institutions” (2003, p. 17). 
In that case, any application of the notion of “Brazilianization” to the global context 
would have to do with the recognition of the modern and indeed contemporary character of 
inequality in these semi-peripheral capitalist societies. That would work more as a mirror 
than as a threat of a fallback into the pre-modern past. 
The roots of Brazilian inequality have a long provenance. Let me step back to the last 
years of the Brazilian Empire, and start with the important political manifesto 
“Abolitionism”, written by Joaquim Nabuco in 1883 (cf. Nabuco, 2000; see also Mello, 2000). 
Nabuco is one of the first interpreters – and political actors – of Brazil to confer the theme of 
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  As regards Brazil, the process has been variously designated. Two of the more forceful arguments have 
developed around the concepts of “conservative modernization” and “selective modernization”. Both 
emphasize the singularity of Brazilian modernization and, by the same token, insist on its being a case of 
modernity – rather than a deviation from or a falling short of it. Cf. Domingues, 2002; 2006; Souza, 2000; 2007. 
 slavery a central place in his analysis of the country’s historical formation and also of its 
social and political destiny (cf. Mello, 1999; Carvalho, 2000). There were very few of them in 
his own time and even in the next generation, when he is only matched by Gilberto Freyre, 
in the 1920s, though the latter drew out other conclusions, contributing to articulate the 
myth of racial democracy that became part of the 1930s state ideology. Souza comments 
that the importance of the institution of slavery in Brazil is strikingly overlooked by many 
interpretations of Brazil, focused as they have been on determining the conditions and 
hindrances for the transplantation of European capitalist and liberal democratic 
modernization. He comments, 
“This aspect is symptomatic for, after all, that is the only institution that managed, in 
such a young nation, to last almost 400 years and disseminate, though under peculiar 
forms, to every region, encompassing the whole of a huge territory. It has been the 
interests organically linked to slavery that allowed for maintaining the unity of the 
vast Brazilian territory and it has also been slavery … that determined even the mode 
of living peculiar to the Brazilian free person” (Souza, 2003, p. 103). 
On the first pages of “Abolitionism”, Nabuco stresses that the abolition would be only 
the immediate task of the movement, whose much more demanding responsibility was to 
reverse the effects of over three centuries of slavery in Brazilian society (Nabuco, 2000, p. 4). 
An indication of the long term difficulties facing the movement was already given in the very 
attitude of the country’s political elite in not tackling slavery. Though acknowledging its 
immorality and economic inefficiency, the elite did not promote the immediate extinction of 
slavery, rather announcing incremental legal measures (the first of which dated from 1850, 
thirty-eight years before abolition!) which left the former nearly untouched (Idem, p. 15-18, 
51-56).  
Nabuco is explicit about the reach and depth of slavery in the making of society’s ethos, 
in all areas: 
“The same as with the word abolitionism, the word slavery is used in this book in its 
broad sense. The latter does not only mean the relation of slave and master; it means 
much more: the sum of power, influence, capital and clientèle of all masters; 
feudalism, established in the hinterland; the dependency in which commerce, 
religion, poverty, industry, the Parliament, the Crown, the State, find themselves 
before the aggregate power of the aristocratic minority, in whose lodgings [senzalas] 
thousands of these human beings live, brutalized and morally mutilated by the very 
regime that subjects them; and last, the spirit, the vital principle which animates the 
institution as a whole, especially as it starts to fear the loss of the immemorial 
property rights it is entitled to, a spirit that has been throughout the history of slave-
holding countries the cause of their backwardness and ruin” (2000, p. 5). 
Nabuco’s greatest fortune was that, while writing in 19th-century England and drawing 
ethical inspiration from its abolitionist movement, he was not “up to date” with the scientific 
racist theories of the time in continental Europe (Morton’s, Lombroso’s or Gobineau’s, for 
instance), that explained and forecast the road to modernity as an intrinsic attribute of the 
white, Western culture – thus eschewing any possibility for a country of mixed race(s) to be 
capable of such a feat. This allowed him to give due appreciation to the indissoluble link 
between the destiny of blacks and freedom for all in Brazil. His straightforward Hegelianism 
emerges in his assertion that the identities of masters and slaves were mutually dependent: 
 “The question in Brazil is not, like in the European colonies, that of a generous 
movement on behalf of men [sic] victim of unjust oppression in far-away shores. The 
black race is not for us an inferior race either, alien to communion or isolated from it, 
and whose well-being affects us in the same way as any indigenous tribe ill-treated 
by the European invaders. For us, the black race is an element of considerable 
national importance, strictly bounded by infinite organic relations to our constitution, 
an integral part of the Brazilian people. On the other hand, emancipation does not 
mean only to bring to an end the injustice of which the slave is a martyr, but it is also 
the simultaneous elimination of both opposing types, who are at bottom the same: 
the slave and the master” (Idem, p. 10). 
Current indicators show Nabuco’s fears and inclusionary views to be warranted. Official 
data from the Brazilian Monitoring Report of the Millennium Development Goals point out 
that between 1992 and 2002, the 20% poorest held 3% of the total income of families came 
to share 4.2% of the total income. However, in the same period, their distance in relation to 
the wealthy hardly changed: “In 1992, the wealthiest 20% had 55.7% of the national income. 
In 1996, they had 55.8% and in 2002, 56.8%”. If one controls these figures by ethnic origin, 
the blacks stand out as the worst off: “The distribution of these groups within the poorest 
10%, on the one hand, and within the wealthiest 1%, on the other, shows that 86% of those 
in the most privileged class were white, while 65% of the poorest were blacks or mulattoes” 
(Ipea; IBGE, 2004, pp. 15-16). In terms of education, “*y+oung whites aged 15 to 17 in 
secondary education have almost double the attendance of young blacks and mulattos. In 
higher education, this difference increases fourfold. And this same picture is found in all the 
regions in the country” (Idem, p. 26). From the income perspective:  
“even among those with 12 or more years of schooling, the white population had an 
hourly wage almost 40% higher than that of the black and mulatto population with 
the same schooling level. In addition to the discrimination that is expressed by the 
occupation of posts requiring similar schooling levels with lower remuneration, the 
explanation of this phenomenon is also related to the issue of occupational 
segmentation. Thus, being a woman and part of the black and mulatto population 
makes it harder to earn higher wages” (Idem, p. 38). 
The Brazilian dilemma, in this light, according to Jessé Souza, is not the permanence of 
residues of personalistic power within an evolving modern order. It is not a case for 
personalism, patrimonialism, or the persistence of pre-modernity within the post-1889 
Republican order – as many sociological interpretations insist. For him, the dilemma is how 
the impersonal capitalist moral order, finally hegemonic in the 1930s, manages to constitute 
itself on the basis of a naturalization of inequality. Having imposed the institutions of the 
modern world – state, market, individualism, impersonal institutional relations, competition, 
citizenship – as ready-made products, without also disseminating a moral understanding of 
social relations that both legitimated the limitation of the rulers’ personal power and 
generalized a “basic” human type as a general reference of social recognition and a 
condition for the full operation of the competitive order, the Brazilian modern capitalist 
order condemns to oblivion and exclusion millions of its citizens – particularly its Afro-
descendents (cf. Souza, 2003; 2007). 
Since the early 1800s, a process of “Europeization” in course was set off, inciting a special 
attraction toward anything British or French, rather than Portuguese, as Souza highlights, 
following the arrival of the royal family in Brazil, fleeing from Bonaparte’s armies. The 
process also ushered in women’s visibility in the private realm (freeing them from total 
 subjection and isolation), and the growing prestige of knowledge and individual talent. This 
process was virtually accomplished in the 1930s, with the adoption of Italian-inspired 
corporatism, the political inclusion of the middle classes and the (legal and political) 
incorporation of urban workers (Cf. Idem, pp. 137-148; Carvalho, 1997; Vianna and Carvalho, 
2000). Meanwhile, associated to the image of inferior, non-European races by the artificers 
of the republican order, blacks and the poor in general were abandoned to themselves, 
deemed less human than the integrated ones, irrespective of any deliberate feeling of 
rejection the latter might personally entertain against any of the wretched ones – which is 
how the contours of an impersonal order emerged!  
So, the generalization of the non-recognition of the poor – particularly the blacks – as a 
full human being and a full citizen is a distinctive mark of Brazilian specificity vis-à-vis so-
called advanced societies (cf. Souza, 2003, pp. 170-180). Brazilian modernity was 
constructed by articulating external models (institutions and values) to the moral matrix of 
slavery. Given the social attitudes of indifference, disgust and intolerance (Christophe 
Dejours’s banalization of injustice) that have proliferated in many countries where the 
combined effects of neoliberalism and globalization have settled and the growing number of 
people counted for nothing in the new economic order, one can argue that such a trait loses 
its particularism in present-day global contexts and articulates a sombre warning as regards 
the combination of capitalism and naturalized inequalities. 
Some indicators of mounting inequality and manifestations of rejection for the poor, the 
immigrants and ethnic minorities can be easily found in any perusal of academic or official 
literature. Take just the 2005 Human Development Report. From the start, the message is 
clear: “The world’s richest 500 individuals have a combined income greater than that of the 
poorest 416 million. Beyond these extremes, the 2.5 billion people living on less than $2 a 
day – 40% of the world’s population – account for 5% of global income. The richest 10%, 
almost all of whom live in high-income countries, account for 54%” (UNDP 2005, p. 4; see, 
for perceptions of the early 2000s, Sen [2002]; Weisbrot [2002]). The Report forecasts that if 
current trends persist, the gaps will only grow. In relation to the Millenium Development 
Goals (MDG), such trends show that by 2015, there will be “more than 41 million children 
who will die before their fifth birthday from the most readily curable of all diseases – 
poverty”. In relation to poverty, there will be “an additional 380 million people living on less 
than $1 a day”. As regards primary education, 47 million children will still be out of school in 
2015 (UNDP, 2005, p. 5). The Report is skeptical about the effects of globalization on 
inequality: 
“when it comes to income, global integration has ushered in a new era of 
convergence. At best, the sentiment is weakly supported by the evidence. Poverty is 
falling, but slowly since the mid-1990s. Meanwhile, global inequality remains at 
extraordinarily high levels. 
In the aggregate the past two decades have witnessed one of the most rapid 
reductions in poverty in world history. However, any assessment of trends in income 
poverty has to take into account large variations across regions. (…) 
The worrying trend for the future is that overall progress is slowing. Much of the 
success in pushing back poverty over the past two decades was achieved in the 1980s 
and the first half of the 1990s. Since the mid-1990s $1 a day poverty has been falling 
at one fifth the 1980–96 rate. This is despite the fact that average growth for 
 developing countries picked up in the 1990s, increasing at more than double the per 
capita rate of the previous decade” (Idem, p. 33-34; see also p. 36-37). 
There have been counter-evidences to that pessimism, as will be seen below. Lower 
levels of poverty in the context of rather conventional social policy instruments are certainly 
connected to different political choices implemented as from 2003 which only very recently 
can be felt in official statistics. They demonstrate the options available even when political 
agency is not bold enough to confront the pro-market orthodoxy. But the general trend is 
clear: we are still dealing with one of the most unequal societies in the world that has 
remained consistently so while it experienced deep advances of the market logic and 
decisive integration to the contemporary global economic, political and cultural flows. 
4. Global pressures, global articulations and cultural awareness in public policy-making 
discourse 
If the argument offered above seems to hide a certain a-synchronism with the 
sophisticated features of technological innovation and social discourses of competition, free 
market, mass consumption and pluralism under the current phase of globalization, the 
1990s brought this disjunction to a moot point. With the election of Fernando Collor de 
Mello in November 1989 and his inauguration in January 1990, Brazil definitively joined the 
neoliberal doxa, starting with a series of liberalising measures which gave great emphasis to 
open markets for foreign competition and the whole range of modernising strategies 
associated with the big corporations. Many companies closed down, many jobs were lost. 
Technological and managerial changes came in and the wonders of being (after all!) attuned 
to “modernity” were loudly and relentlessly voiced by political, intellectual and 
entrepreneurial elites! 
This is then the time when everyone everywhere seemed to have found one word to sum 
up the changing times: globalization. As in every case of dissemination of new imaginaries, it 
was not so much shared contents or precise definitions that mattered, but the imaginary 
and non-systematic connections made by users between the issues they were struggling 
with and the general motif of a majestic external force prescribing (more) modernization as 
the only future ahead for (semi)peripheral societies. To be sure, very few people knew what 
they were talking about, but they seemed all hard pressed to include references to 
globalization in any talk about the world newly emerging from the exhaustion of military-led 
developmentalist projects, the worsening social conditions under the post-1985 civilian 
government, and the crisis of really existing socialism. In all this, media discourse played a 
major part in popularising ordinary talk of globalization and multiplying information and 
images from near and far that seemed to escalate into a broad picture of a process that 
could not be resisted since it was “happening everywhere”. 
A different matter is the direct incorporation of neoliberal theoretical and practical 
arguments about the need for downsizing the state, freeing it from the “authoritarian” 
legacy of interventionism, high taxation, administrative inefficiency and social spending. For 
this, consultants were hired, studies were conducted, visits were planned, a new breed of 
public servants was trained, and an articulate political project was drafted. In 1994, the 
election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in the wake of the most successful anti-inflation 
policy ever implemented in Brazil, gave rise to a distinctive “third-way” discourse, combining 
neoliberal emphases on competition, free market, privatization and managerialism with 
social democratic trappings regarding commitment to fairness, care for the poorest among 
 the poor, limited income distribution and more participation of beneficiaries in public policy 
making. During two terms in office, Cardoso led a number of reforms that included structural 
adjustment policies and a changing social policy profile that valued elements like “active 
citizenship”, “partnership with civil society”, “focus on outcomes rather than bureaucratic 
processes”, the development of a “culture of evaluation”, and recognition of identity, 
culture and pluralism in the definition of policy goals and procedures (cf. Burity, 2006b). 
In all this, the typical note is the reference to globalization as the horizon from which 
those changes got their intelligibility. The irreversibility of the process was said to dictate the 
adoption of proposed measures regardless of ideological persuasion. The economistic logic 
expanded toward the whole range of processes of deliberation and decision-making at the 
policy level, justifying “the bitterness of the remedy” in the name of the greater cure for the 
evils of backwardness and statism. Nobody could dare opt out of the only way forward 
(pensée unique). As the Minister for Administration and State Reform, Luiz Carlos Bresser 
Pereira, bluntly put before a beleaguered nationwide audience of Brazilian social scientists in 
October 1995, who rejected his reasons for reforming public administration and withdraw 
the state from direct implementation of social programmes: “It is a pity you’re choosing to 
miss the train of history!” 
The 1990s juncture brought together several developments which, though not 
necessarily requiring a reference to globalization, nonetheless tended to draw legitimacy 
from it, thus reinforcing its justification. As regards practical politics and political culture, one 
can mention the dissemination of pro-market values and policies, intolerance against ideas 
that privileged or prescribed state regulation and direct provision of public goods; 
paradoxically, intense state activism (particularly from the Executive) in promoting changes 
to the institutional and legal frameworks in order to accommodate the new capitalist 
culture. Simultaneously, there was an emphasis on civil society proactive initiatives in finding 
solutions for the problems that either could no longer be resolved by the state or should not 
be left to its responsibility, as well as a heightened sensitivity toward an agenda of civic 
activism and identity issues coming from the global circulation of such discourses that 
originated in the advanced societies new social movements and NGO networks. Many 
cultural and identity demands were transformistically incorporated by international financial 
institutions in the period, leading to a legitimation of them which caused their becoming 
part of conditionalities imposed by the former on the countries that sought funding for 
projects, crises or debt alleviation. 
Social movements organized around identity issues – gender, racism, access to culture, 
religion, etc. – slowly articulated a discourse in which their demands expressed the 
multidimensional character of exclusion and inequality as well as the persistence or slow 
improvement with which these demands were met vis-à-vis the advances in economic 
performance. Such discourse also highlighted the extent to which there were cultural 
reasons behind the paucity of the significant changes to the problems faced by those 
movements’ participants (cf. Dagnino, Escobar, Alvarez, 1998; Avritzer, 2002; Gohn, 1997; 
Scherer-Warren, 1999). 
Several public policies introduced pieces and bits of this new social movement agenda, as 
long as they fitted the government views: in land reform, health, education, social welfare, 
environmental programmes issues of gender, race, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, and 
multiculturalism became part of the considerations and oriented some decisions. Brazil 
actively participated in the UN conferences cycle started with Eco-92 in Rio, and voiced on 
 those different occasions rather progressive official positions on women’s, blacks’, 
indigenous people’s and environmental rights, and the cultural dimension was incrementally 
accepted into development views and strategies. Cultural policy proper has clearly moved 
toward adopting discourses of cultural pluralism or multiculturalism – even though several 
of its components actually clash or sit uneasily with the historic trajectory of multicultural 
relations in the country, strongly oriented toward syncretism and hybrid identities, and not 
so mono-cultural as European and American identity politics. This was not unrelated to the 
dissemination-effect of transnational organizations, the international cooperation for 
development and the first echoes of an emerging global civil society onto domestic 
governmental discourse.  
On the other hand, culture and globalization also became part of counter-hegemonic 
discourses. Brazilian social movements and the increasingly salient field of the non-
governmental organizations, truly globalized from the early 1990s, slowly incorporated the 
new cultural discourse twisting it toward calls for solidarity and global mobilization in order 
to resist the dark side of its neoliberal hegemonic project and bend the obtuseness of 
conservative elites or even the prevailing general culture of society regarding workers’ and 
minorities’ rights, not to mention human rights as an indivisible group of rights and social 
obligations. As most of the groups that appropriated such vocabulary in the articulation of 
their demands operated locally and at small-scale projects, the impact over a decade of this 
new discursive context can already be felt by merely over-viewing their public statements, 
project drafts and internal discussion documents. Even the labour union movement has 
moved in that direction and is firmly involved in providing space for cultural demands in the 
conduction of its cadre formation policy and in its participation of networks where such 
demands are crucial (cf. Burity, 2006a, b). 
In all these developments, the role of globalization, as rhetoric or in terms of the real 
effects of its flows and concrete actors’ interventions, has marked the new face of Brazilian 
society, particularly its political and economic elites, since the 1990s: still unable to sort out 
its huge inequality record, prey to a certain fatalistic realism about the possibilities of change 
in the global scenario, but gladly joining the chorus of those who take the recent trends for 
the final accomplishment of the unfinished project of modernity. The past few years have 
witnessed some degree of self-assertion in Brazilian foreign policy and the grip of global 
discourses became subject to more complex negotiations in public policy. Some authors and 
official data have drawn attention to falling rates of inequality and poverty, but are cautious 
regarding its sustainability (cf. Néri, 2007; Góis, 2007; Brazil, 2007, p. 12, 27-30, passim). 
The previous two sections allow for a number of points to be made. It would be pathetic 
to deny the long-term roots of unequal social relations in the constitution of modern Brazil. 
Although it sits increasingly out of joint with the advances in social organization of the 
subaltern groups, the social, political and cultural background of present-day ails remains, 
reproducing a pattern of non-recognition of the poor, women, blacks and other 
discriminated groups that is reflected in the figures of inequality. Just as, in the wane of 
slavery, millions of Brazilian former slaves and their descendents formed a mass of invisible 
citizens, to whom rights were lacking and social integration was denied through their 
confinement in the urban slums, out schools, health care and decent jobs, the path of 
opening toward globalization has not altered these circumstances. On top of economic 
deprivation, most Brazilian poor being also Afro-descendents – though representing over 45 
% of the population – have also had to face racial discrimination that no upward mobility of 
 the few successful ones has been able to appease. Gender and racial exclusion combine, still, 
to victimize black women even more deeply. 
Naturalized inequality, which in Brazil has been coupled with an enduring bias against its 
Afro-descendent population and gives a racial twist to poverty, educational and income 
levels, job availability and even political representation, converged with the global/local 
post-1989 dynamics. The drive toward competition, efficiency, market relations and 
disarticulation of the nation state regulatory powers which was introduced then generated 
and spread corporate, political and social attitudes of demeaning toward unemployed, 
illiterate or under-schooled people. Several arguments and forms of everyday derogatory or 
stigmatising discourse formerly used to express racial prejudice came back, apparently 
without the racial sting, in order to spot or assess the new order’s outcasts or misfits. 
However, if the global lesson of Brazil’s rise is the dire need of squaring global demands 
and social demands, there are counter-tendencies in action. The setting of globalization is 
wider and more complex than mere economic readings would warrant. In different and 
interwoven ways, the rise of new social movements intersect with the translocal enactment 
of globalized networks for equality, justice, peace and environmental awareness, and with 
pressures from powerful international organizations (in turn prompted by governmental and 
non-governmental demands) for the adoption of complex forms of social equality. Part of 
this process has involved a double mobilization of cultural resources: on the one hand, by 
revealing the symbolic dimensions of exclusion, poverty, violence, the operation of political 
institutions and procedures, the values and imaginaries on which they are produced, 
sustained or confronted; on the other hand, by constituting new forms of identification on 
the basis of identity traits other than class or socio-economic conditions.  
Such a mobilization has led in several directions: a) the widening of social demands 
beyond material distribution of resources; b) the acknowledgement that cultural constraints 
on social development, represented by entrenched forms of life or identity claims, can not 
be uprooted with impunity without damaging valuable means ordinary people have to cope 
with major social changes while retaining their protagonist role in the process; c) global 
flows may serve local struggles for democracy and social justice, but they are still biased 
toward a certain conception of market freedom that is just as particularistic as any local road 
to development. In order to articulate or furthering these claims, a global/local dialectics 
was put to work in contextual ways. With and against each other, local and global actors 
produced a tangle of initiatives that has cut deep into the fabric of the contemporary 
Brazilian social formation. 
Whether Brazil, as an emerging power, for all its complex articulation of local and global 
features, economic advance and social unevenness, can meet the challenge of contemporary 
discourses on social and environmental justice and match some of the well established 
global partners is a matter of political action as much as of social and cultural change. 
However, its rise in the present juncture is telling, both for its reiteration of a lasting failure 
of capitalism to harmonize economic freedom with social equality, pointing to what extent 
globalization can give us more of the same, and for showing what role cultural politics – 
understood as symbolic disputes for the meaning and direction of social situations and 
processes, as well as the political mobilization of identities as symptoms of social failure to 
produce inclusion and justice – can play in the present and the future.  
 Culture counts, for there is no social process without symbolic, signifying practices, and 
because many of the contemporary points of political antagonism turn around cultural 
differences. Fighting inequality, therefore, involves both cultural struggles and cultural 
sensitivity but cannot take place outside political agency. This is still what the emergence of 
so-called global South (one more sweeping, big word meant to encompass such distinct 
cases) keeps in reserve: it is a promise of alternative paths, with some steps taken, but the 
assessment of whither it is going must make room for hegemonic stalemates and political 
drawbacks along the way. 
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